An edition of Market discipline and financial safety net design
(1999)
Market discipline and financial safety net design
by Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt
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It is difficult to design and implement an effective safety net for banks, because overgenerous protection of banks may introduce a risk-enhancing moral hazard and destabilize the very system it is meant to protect. The safety net that policymakers design must provide the right mix of market and regulatory discipline, enough to protect depositors without unduly undermining market discipline on banks.
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Subjects
Deposit insurance, Banks and banking, RiskShowing 2 featured editions. View all 2 editions?
| Edition | Availability |
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1
Market discipline and financial safety net design
1999, Centre for Economic Policy Research
in English
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2
Market discipline and financial safety net design
1999, World Bank, Development Research Group, Finance
in English
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Book Details
Edition Notes
Includes bibliographical references (p. 28-29).
"September 1999"--Cover.
Also available on the World Wide Web.
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| September 14, 2020 | Edited by MARC Bot | import existing book |
| February 3, 2010 | Edited by WorkBot | add more information to works |
| December 9, 2009 | Created by WorkBot | add works page |