| Record ID | marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-031.mrc:141080851:3717 |
| Source | marc_columbia |
| Download Link | /show-records/marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-031.mrc:141080851:3717?format=raw |
LEADER: 03717cam a2200721 i 4500
001 15097398
005 20221112231434.0
006 m o d
007 cr |n|||||||||
008 140228s2014 nyua ob 001 0 eng d
035 $a(OCoLC)ocn871210746
035 $a(NNC)15097398
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019 $a863034652$a863824536$a1086436457
020 $a9781317913214$q(electronic bk.)
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020 $z9780415730099$q(hbk.)
020 $z0415730090$q(hbk.)
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035 $a(OCoLC)871210746$z(OCoLC)863034652$z(OCoLC)863824536$z(OCoLC)1086436457
037 $a1562304$bProquest Ebook Central
050 4 $aJF229$b.P37 2014
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049 $aZCUA
100 1 $aPelizzo, Riccardo,$eauthor.
245 10 $aGovernment accountability and legislative oversight /$cRiccardo Pelizzo and Frederick Stapenhurst.
264 1 $aNew York, NY :$bRoutledge,$c2014.
300 $a1 online resource (xvi, 111 pages) :$billustrations
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $acomputer$bc$2rdamedia
338 $aonline resource$bcr$2rdacarrier
490 1 $aRoutledge research in comparative politics ;$v58
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505 0 $aEvolving accountability : implications for legislative oversight -- What can be overseen by a legislature? -- Internal oversight tools -- External oversight factors -- Facilitating conditions -- A conceptual framework for accountability and the Stapenhurst-Pelizzo index of legislative oversight (SPILO) -- Conclusions.
588 0 $aPrint version record.
520 $aThe purpose of the book is to investigate parliaments' capacity to oversee government activities, policies and budget legislation. By analysing the survey data that the World Bank Institute in collaboration with the Inter-Parliamentary Union collected from 120 parliaments, Pelizzo and Stapenhurst show what tools are available to parliaments worldwide, which tools are more or less common, how oversight capacity can be estimated, how oversight capacity is related to other institutional and constitutional factors. In addition to discussing the conditions under which oversight capacity is great.
650 0 $aLegislative oversight.
650 0 $aExecutive-legislative relations.
650 0 $aGovernment accountability.
650 0 $aComparative government.
650 6 $aContrôle parlementaire.
650 6 $aRelations exécutif-législatif.
650 6 $aObligation de rendre compte (Administration publique)
650 7 $aPOLITICAL SCIENCE$xGovernment$xLegislative Branch.$2bisacsh
650 7 $aComparative government.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00871341
650 7 $aExecutive-legislative relations.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00917874
650 7 $aGovernment accountability.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01746414
650 7 $aLegislative oversight.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00995810
700 1 $aStapenhurst, Frederick,$eauthor.
776 08 $iPrint version:$z9780415730099$z0415730090$w(DLC) 2013026404
830 0 $aRoutledge research in comparative politics ;$v58.
856 40 $uhttp://www.columbia.edu/cgi-bin/cul/resolve?clio15097398$zTaylor & Francis eBooks
852 8 $blweb$hEBOOKS