MARC Record from marc_columbia

LEADER: 02137cam a2200337 i 4500
001 12216887
005 20161219172114.0
008 160401s2016 enk b 001 0 eng d
020 $a9780198759591$qhardback
020 $a0198759592$qhardback
024 $a99969243223
035 $a(OCoLC)ocn946011000
035 $a(OCoLC)946011000
035 $a(NNC)12216887
040 $aERASA$beng$erda$cERASA$dBTCTA$dBDX$dNhCcYBP
050 4 $aQA8.4$b.H67 2016
082 04 $a510.1$223
100 1 $aHorsten, Leon,$eauthor.
245 10 $aGödel's disjunction :$bthe scope and limits of mathematical knowledge /$cLeon Horsten, Philip Welsh.
250 $aFirst edition.
264 1 $aOxford ;$aNew York, NY :$bOxford University Press,$c2016.
300 $a277 pages ;$c24 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$bnc$2rdacarrier
520 8 $aThe logician Kurt Godel in 1951 established a disjunctive thesis about the scope and limits of mathematical knowledge: either the mathematical mind is equivalent to a Turing machine (i.e., a computer), or there are absolutely undecidable mathematical problems. In the second half of the twentieth century, attempts have been made to arrive at a stronger conclusion. In particular, arguments have been produced by the philosopher J.R. Lucas and by the physicist and mathematician Roger Penrose that intend to show that the mathematical mind is more powerful than any computer. These arguments, and counterarguments to them, have not convinced the logical and philosophical community. The reason for this is an insufficiency if rigour in the debate. The contributions in this volume move the debate forward by formulating rigorous frameworks and formally spelling out and evaluating arguments that bear on Godel's disjunction in these frameworks. The contributions in this volume have been written by world leading experts in the field.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
600 10 $aGödel, Kurt.
650 0 $aMathematics$xPhilosophy.
700 1 $aWelsh, Philip,$eauthor.
852 00 $boff,glx$hQA8.4$i.H67 2016g