MARC Record from marc_columbia

LEADER: 03337cam a2200409Ka 4500
001 7924376
005 20221201044534.0
008 081209s2008 dcub b 000 0 eng d
020 $a9789812308870 :$c$10.00
020 $a9812308873 :$c$10.00
029 1 $aAU@$b000043682872
029 1 $aCDX$b9309896
035 $a(OCoLC)ocn277240001
035 $a(NNC)7924376
035 $a(OCoLC)277240001
035 $a7924376
040 $aHWE$cHWE$dYDXCP$dCLU$dSINLB$dCDX
043 $aa-th---
050 14 $aDS588.S68$bF86 2008
082 04 $a303.6909593$222
100 1 $aFunston, N. J.$q(N. John)$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n84135541
245 10 $aSouthern Thailand :$bthe dynamics of conflict /$cJohn Funston.
260 $aWashington, DC :$bEast-West Center Washington,$c2008.
300 $axiv, 81 pages :$bmap ;$c24 cm.
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
490 1 $aPolicy studies,$x1547-1349 ;$v50 (Southeast Asia)
500 $aThis publication is a product of the project on 'Internal Conflicts and State-Building Challenges in Asia'.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [55]-57).
520 $aThis monograph examines the tragic conflict in Thailand's southern Muslim-majority provinces near the border with Malaysia. Although the conflict has attracted wide national and international interest, no agreement exists on the cause of the resumption of violence in an area that had remained free of major conflict for two decades. This monograph critically examines explanations for the conflict and traces its evolution from the early 1990s to the beginning of the Samak government in 2008. The study points to a wide variety of factors that were important in the resumption of the conflict, with policies of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra being critical in determining the timing and intensity of the violence. These conditions include: (1) the resumption of an age-old conflict between Malay Muslims from Pattani, Yala, and Narithiwat Provinces against a discriminatory central government; (2) entrenched problems of criminality in an area far from the capital and with a porous border with Malaysia; (3) the disbanding of important conflict resolution institutions by former Prime Minister Thaksin, who then gave priority to hard line (sometimes extrajudicial) security policies; (4) growing Islamic religiosity, influenced by regional reform movements and international developments, including the example of extremist movements such as Jemaah Islamiyah; and (5) the growth of southern insurgent movements--which have never issued public demands and whose real leaders remain unknown. In this complex setting, no resolution to the violence appears likely in the near future, as Thaksin's main policies have been retained since the September 2006 coup that ousted his government.
650 0 $aInsurgency$zThailand, Southern.
651 0 $aThailand, Southern$xHistory$xAutonomy and independence movements.
650 0 $aIslam and politics$zThailand.
650 0 $aConflict management$zThailand.
710 2 $aEast-West Center Washington.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2004013803
830 0 $aPolicy studies (East-West Center Washington) ;$v50.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2004013809
852 00 $boff,leh$hDS588.S68$iF86 2008