An edition of The dynamics of firm lobbying (2011)

The dynamics of firm lobbying

The dynamics of firm lobbying
William R. Kerr, William R. Ke ...
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Last edited by MARC Bot
September 21, 2024 | History
An edition of The dynamics of firm lobbying (2011)

The dynamics of firm lobbying

We study the determinants of the dynamics of firm lobbying behavior using a panel data set covering 1998-2006. Our data exhibit three striking facts: (i) few firms lobby, (ii) lobbying status is strongly associated with firm size, and (iii) lobbying status is highly persistent over time. Estimating a model of a firm's decision to engage in lobbying, we find significant evidence that up-front costs associated with entering the political process help explain all three facts. We then exploit a natural experiment in the expiration in legislation surrounding the H-1B visa cap for high-skilled immigrant workers to study how these costs affect firms' responses to policy changes. We find that companies primarily adjusted on the intensive margin: the firms that began to lobby for immigration were those who were sensitive to H-1B policy changes and who were already advocating for other issues, rather than firms that became involved in lobbying anew. For a firm already lobbying, the response is determined by the importance of the issue to the firm's business rather than the scale of the firm's prior lobbying efforts. These results support the existence of significant barriers to entry in the lobbying process.

Publish Date
Language
English
Pages
32

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Edition Availability
Cover of: The dynamics of firm lobbying
The dynamics of firm lobbying
2013, Harvard Business School
in English
Cover of: The dynamics of firm lobbying
The dynamics of firm lobbying
2011, Harvard Business School
in English

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Book Details


Edition Notes

"October 2011. (Revised August 2013.)" -- Publisher's website.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 27-32).

Published in
Boston]
Series
Working paper / Harvard Business School -- 12-034, Working paper (Harvard Business School) -- 12-034

The Physical Object

Pagination
32 pages, 15 unnumbered pages
Number of pages
32

ID Numbers

Open Library
OL54477746M
OCLC/WorldCat
857279991

Work Description

We study the determinants of the dynamics of firm lobbying behavior using a panel data set covering 1998-2006. Our data exhibit three striking facts: (i) few firms lobby, (ii) lobbying status is strongly associated with firm size, and (iii) lobbying status is highly persistent over time. Estimating a model of a firm's decision to engage in lobbying, we find significant evidence that up- front costs associated with entering the political process help explain all three facts. We then exploit a natural experiment in the expiration in legislation surrounding the H-1B visa cap for high-skilled immigrant workers to study how these costs affect firms' responses to policy changes. We find that companies primarily adjusted on the intensive margin: the firms that began to lobby for immigration were those who were sensitive to H-1B policy changes and who were already advocating for other issues, rather than firms that became involved in lobbying anew. For a firm already lobbying, the response is determined by the importance of the issue to the firm's business rather than the scale of the firm's prior lobbying efforts. These results support the existence of significant barriers to entry in the lobbying process.

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September 21, 2024 Created by MARC Bot Imported from harvard_bibliographic_metadata record